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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

II.

Appellants First Security Corporation (“FSC”) and Richard D. Fosbury (“Fosbury”),

hereby ﬁle

A.

this reply brief

Statement

0n appeal.

Of Facts

FSC and Fosbury are unclear What Belle Ranch, LLC
AgriFinance,

LLC (“RABO”)1 means when it says

(“Belle Ranch”) and

Rabo

“Appellants’ Statement 0f Facts omits

important material and undisputed facts.” Resp. Br.

at 5.

FSC and Fosbury have reviewed their

Statement 0f Facts in comparison With Belle Ranch’s Statement of Facts and ﬁnd no material
differences. A11 recorded

documents are discussed, chaining

title

in 7.5/289th

37-481C, 37-482H, 37—483C, 37-577BT, and 37-2630 (“Water Rights”) t0
the

Water Rights

As expected on

to Fosbury.

of water right nos.

FSC and 7.8/289th

of

appeal, the parties differ in their opinion as t0 the

relevance and importance of certain documents in relation t0 their ownership 0f the Water Rights
in this quiet title action.

ARGUMENT

III.

While wanting

to paint itself differently, Belle

and Fosbury. Resp. Br.

stands in the

Seeing Belle Ranch differently

at 20.

FSC, Fosbury, and Belle Ranch

County prior t0 issuance of the

is

where the

“same shoes”

as

FSC

district court erred.

are all successors—in-interest to South County, deriving their

respective ownership in the 289/289th of the

Water Rights through conveyances made by South

SRBA partial decrees

conveyances, the chain of title shows
7.8/289th 0f the

Ranch

FSC owns

in

South County’s name. Through those

7.5/289th 0f the

Water Rights, Fosbury owns

Water Rights, and Belle Ranch owns 273.7/289th 0f the Water Rights. Belle

Ranch’s entire response

rests

on painting

itself differently

from

FSC and Fosbury because

of a

As stated by Belle Ranch and RABO, “For purposes 0f this appeal, and Where appropriate, the phrase “Belle
Ranch” should be construed t0 mean both Belle Ranch and its secured lender, RABO.” Resp. Br. at 3, fn. 2.
1
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1

“window of opportunity” it claims existed after issuance of the SRBA partial decrees in the name
of South County and before entry of the SRBA district court’s Final Unified Decree. Resp. Br. at
15. During this window, Belle Ranch points to administrative form documents it filed with
IDWR – not the SRBA district court – to support its ownership of the 7.5/289th owned by FSC
and the 7.8/289th owned by Fosbury. This “window of opportunity” was explained in the
Opening Brief (pages 30-36), and as a matter of law did nothing to affect ownership of the Water
Rights to the benefit or detriment of the parties before the Court. The district court erred in
determining that ownership is defined, not by deeds of record, but instead by administrative form
documents filed with IDWR after issuance of the SRBA partial decrees and before issuance of
the SRBA Final Unified Decree.
A.

Belle Ranch Does Not Rebut Key Arguments Presented By FSC And Fosbury
It is important to first highlight arguments FSC and Fosbury made in the Opening Brief

that are unrebutted by Belle Ranch, demonstrating FSC’s and Fosbury’s respective ownership of
the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights. First, Belle Ranch does not disagree that water rights are real
property that may be lawfully conveyed separately from land. Opening Br. at 25 citing Joyce
Livestock Co. v. United States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502 (2007). Here, South County followed
the law when it reserved the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights and conveyed 7.5/289th to FSC’s
predecessors-in-interest and the and 7.8/289th to Fosbury’s predecessors-in-interest.
Second, Belle Ranch does not disagree that Idaho is a “race-notice recording state . . . .”
Opening Br. at 27-28 citing Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 783, 302 P.3d 1052, 1056
(2013). Here, the deeds that control ownership of the 15.3/289th were recorded prior to any
deeds conveying the remaining 273.7/289th to Belle Ranch’s predecessors-in-interest. See Resp.
Br., Ex. A. (showing the 15.3/289th was released, conveyed, and recorded by South County as of
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March

2010, which

1,

273.7/289th to

is

prior to South County’s June 17,

2010 conveyance of the remaining

MWB).
Ranch does not disagree

Third, Belle

that

mortgages place “a lien upon everything that

would pass by a grant or conveyance of the property,” LC.
not pass

_

title

mortgaged property,” In Re:

but rather subsequent purchasers

(1 937),

mortgage,

t0 the

Adams

v.

§ 45-906,

0n Rehearing, 57

may take their title

and

that “a

mortgage does

Idaho 213, 217,

_

P.

_,

subject to a previously recorded

George, 119 Idaho 973, 976-77, 812 P.2d 280, 283-84 (1991). Here, even

if

MWB2 had previously recorded secured interests that were not released, those secured interests
d0 not defeat South County’s conveyances 0f the 15.3/289th
in-interest.

As

raised

by Belle Ranch, Resp.

below, the mortgages did not “void”
Fourth, Belle

property

.

.

.

may be

Ranch does disagree

at 28.

— Which

title.

known to

Lewiston Lime C0.

v.

the law in real

Barney, 87

Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 260, 668 P.2d 130, 136 (Ct.

With only one passing reference

of limitations argument, Resp. Br.

plain language

v.

in Section F,

ownership.

that “every estate 0r interest

determined in an action t0 quiet

App. 1983). Opening Br.

FSC and Fosbury’s predecessors-

and as will be discussed

FSC and Fosbury’s

Idaho 462, 394 P.2d 323 (1964).” Aldape

statute

Br. at 34,

t0

at 37,

Belle

t0

LC.

§ 6-401 in relation to a

Ranch does not disagree with

that statute’s

the district court never examined, applied, or reconciled with Idaho’s

water adjudication statutes in Chapter 14, Title 42, Idaho Code — that actions to quiet

title

to

water right elements of “source, quantity, point of diversion, place 0f use, nature 0f use, period

0f use, and priority against other water users

2

shall

be brought under the provisions 0f chapter

14,

MWB

and GBCI Other Real Estate, LLC (“GBCI”) expressly disclaimed any interest in these proceedings. R2.
349-5 1. Pursuant to an express written agreement With Idaho Independent Bank With regard t0 the 7.5/289‘h 0f the

MWB

Water Rights owned by FSC,
released all of its interest in the 7.5/289th owned by FSC and the 7.8/289th
owned by Fosbury, then entered into a deed in lieu to obtain the land and the rest of the water, which was later
and GBCI have chosen not to ﬁle any
deeded to GBCI and eventually to Belle Ranch. Opening Br. at 7-10.
responsive brieﬁng. Order Re: Respondents Brief— Docket N0. 46144-201 8/4614 7-2018 (May 13, 2019).

MWB

’
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title

42, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 6-401. Idaho’s quiet

“name and address of the claimant,”

title statute

I.C. § 42-1409(1)(a), or

cardinal rule 0f statutory construction

is

that

Where a

does not mention ownership,

any semblance 0f those words. “A

statute is plain, clear

and unambiguous,

away

courts are constrained to follow that plain meaning, and neither add to the statute nor take

bV

judicial construction.”

Kemmer v. Newman,

161 Idaho 463, 467-68, 387 P.3d 131, 135-36

(2016) (emphasis added). Here, the parties to this appeal agree that the presiding judge of the

SRBA,

sitting in his capacity as a district court judge,

United States

v.

water

its

jurisdiction to quiet

right, as

make

expressed in I.C.

title

the only

outcome

is listed

in the

is

the

Ranch does not

are

contest the afﬁrmative statements

Department does not possess the legal authority

If ownership

right

its

because South County

Dist.

v.

at

36-37.

in this

deputy attorneys general that the

“IDWR only maintains

ownership records pursuant t0 Idaho Code Section 42-248.
is

was decided,

made by IDWR

.

.

.

.

The

a district court.” Opening Br. at 17

837 and 843. IDWR’S understanding 0f its statutory authority

A & B Irr.

is

t0 determine ownership:

appropriate forum t0 resolve a dispute over ownership

is

entitled t0 deference.

Idaho Dept. 0f Water Res., 154 Idaho 652, 653-54, 301 P.3d 1270, 1271-72

(2012). Therefore, documents ﬁled with

3

SRBA.

owned by South County. This

record through an afﬁdavit of staff and correspondence from

and updates water

of an Idaho

Therefore, the question of ownership of these Water

“name and address” ﬁeld of the Water Rights. See Opening Br.

Fifth, Belle

Cash, Case N0.

to anything other than the traditional elements

§ 6-401.

Water Rights

v.

to nothing in the record that the district court

Rights was never raised, addressed, or established through the

citing R.

decisions as to ownership, see

Pioneer Irr. Dist, 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007); Cash

CV-2016-02 (Camas County),3 yet can point
exercised

could

The district court decision
below in Section D.

in

Cash
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v.

IDWR asserting ownership can do nothing more than

Cash was appended

to Belle

Ranch’s brief in response and Will be discussed

4

update a record and cannot operate t0 unravel Idaho’s well established and recognized

conveyance and recording system,

never addressed 0r reconciled

district court

title,

B.

§§ 55-601, 55-809, 55-810, and 55-81

I.C.

and recording

IDWR’S

1,

55-812. The

statements With Idaho’s adjudication, quiet

statutes.

Was N0 Window Of Opportunity For Belle Ranch To Take Away The
15.3/289th From FSC And Fosbury

There

Citing LC. § 42-1409, Belle

0f claim” in the

The only

SRBA,

action Belle

Ranch

criticizes

FSC and Fosbury’s

for not ﬁling “a notice

Resp. Br. at 23, 26 citing LC. § 42-1409; yet, neither did Belle Ranch.

Ranch can hang

“Window 0f opportunity”

Belle

its

hat 0n t0 differentiate itself from

Ranch says

existed in the

FSC and Fosbury is

SRBA that allowed Belle Ranch,

a

and

only Belle Ranch, t0 take ownership of the entire 289/289th in direct contravention 0f the deeds

of record and

their

having no

interests. Resp. Br. at 15.

Belle

Ranch claims

partial decrees

it

less than constructive notice

As

0f FSC’S and Fosbury’s respective

discussed in the Opening Brief (pages 30-36), the opportunity

availed itself 0f was ﬁling form documents with

were issued 0n August

3

1,

IDWR,

after the

SRBA

2010, and before the Final Uniﬁed Decree was issued

0n August 26, 2014.
Because 0f this, Belle Ranch’s

citation t0 the Final

“administrative changes to the elements of a water right

to the entry

of this Final Uniﬁed Decree,” Resp. Br.

added), goes directly t0 What

IDWR is

at

Uniﬁed Decree’s sanctioning of

m

entry 0f a partial decree, but

m

32 citing Final Uniﬁed Decree (emphasis

statutorily authorized t0 do,

and not d0. As discussed,

IDWR has n0 authority t0 and therefore cannot alter deeded ownership 0f water rights. IDWR is
statutorily authorized to

0f use,” LC.

§

change only the “point of diversion, place of use, period of use or nature

42-2220), of an

administrative agency

is

SRBA partial decree. IDWR can d0 nothing more. “An

a creature 0f statute, limited to the
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power and

authority granted to

it

by

5

.”

the Legislature

.

.

.

Welch

(1996) (emphasis added).

v.

Due

Del Monte Corp, 128 Idaho 513, 514, 915 P.2d 1371, 1372
t0

an express lack of authority, no documents ﬁled With

SRBA partial decrees

and before entry of the

after issuance

0f the

establish

against the deeds 0f record in Blaine County. Belle

title

overturn established law that the only

and the water

C.

SRBA Final Uniﬁed Decree
Ranch

is

asking this Court to

bifurcate ownership of the underlying real property

conveyance document. Joyce

right is to speciﬁcally reserve the water right in the

The

Livestock.

way t0

IDWR

SRBA Final Uniﬁed Decree does not strip the water right from the property.

IDWR Has N0 Statutory Authority T0 Alter Deeds Of Record
In

its

Memorandum Decision 0n Motion for Reconsideration ofSummary Judgment,

district court incorrectly

IDWR could be effectuated

held that a change of ownership With

through LC. § 42-222. R. 1931. Belle Ranch attempts to support the
understanding 0f IDWR’S authority by stating:

the

district court’s incorrect

“A water right transfer i[s]

a permanent 0r long-

term change to a water right’s point of diversion 0r a change t0 the place 0f use, period of use,
and/or nature ofuse and ownership. I.C. § 42-222; R. 1196.
assertions, I.C. § 42-248(4) speciﬁcally provides that

.

.

.

.

Contrary t0 Appellants’

change of ownership can be accomplished

under a Section 42-222 transfer proceeding. The law could not be more clear.” Resp. Br.

at

29

(emphasis added).
Again,

“IDWR maintains

ownership:
§ 42-248.

right.” R.

ﬁlings

IDWR, by its own

.

.

.

.

admission, possesses no statutory authority t0 alter deeded

and updates water right ownership records pursuant

t0 Idaho

Code

IDWR does not have the legal authority to determine ownership of a water

36-37 (emphasis added). Therefore, even though

made pursuant

to

LC.

§

42-248, that statute gives

IDWR updates its records through

IDWR n0 authority t0 alter deeded

ownership.
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By its plain language,

a water right transfer ﬁled pursuant t0 I.C. § 42-2220) allows

IDWR t0 change only four (4)
u_se,

.”

period 0f use or nature of use

controls, State

v.

.

.

Owens, 158 Idaho

“creature 0f statute

.

.

.

5 14, 915 P.2d at 1372.

four elements of an

.

1, 3,

power and

t0 the

SRBA partial decree:

elements of an

LC.

42-2220). The plain meaning of the

§

IDWR being limited,

authority granted to

Legislature

with

the source 0f water,

—

(d).

by the

SRBA partial decree that are before IDWR in the transfer,

four (4) other water right elements of an

141 1(2)(a)

it

.”
.

.

.

as a

Welch

at

An administrative transfer proceeding can result in a change t0 the only

99 66

Due to IDWR’s

IDWR pursuant t0 LC.

§

IDWR,

LC.

§

42-2220),

such as updating the agency’s

IDWR is statutorily precluded from changing

record through LC. § 42-248. Said differently,

99 66

statute

343 P.3d 30, 32 (2015), with

and cannot be confused With other actions performed by

claimant,

“point of diversion, place of

SRBA partial decree: “name and address

of the

the quantity of water,” and “the date 0f priority.” I.C. § 42-

limited statutory authority, that Belle

42-222 and LC.

§ 42-248,

Ranch ﬁled documents

does nothing to defeat

FSC and

Fosbury’s previously recorded, deeded ownership in the 15.3/289th 0f the Water Rights.

D.

Judge Wildman’s Decision In Cash

Water And Land
Belle

J.

Is

Ranch attempts

Wildman’s decision

in

v.

Cash Foreshadowed This Case Where

to support the district court through citation t0 the

Camas County in Cash

v.

Cash “ﬁled notices of claim

facts before

him, Judge

Belle

SRBA.

On December 5,

There, in 1989,

SRBA. He
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identiﬁed

2006, the Director 0f

RABO attach Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and Exhibit C t0 their Joint Response Brief.
A and Exhibit B are generally accurate, but d0 omit some key documents.

Ranch and

its

Wildman held ownership of

for the three water rights at issue in the

himself as the sole claimant of the rights in his claims.

Exhibit

Honorable Eric

Cash, Which Belle Ranch attaches to

water right nos. 37-444, 37-2541 and 37-7636 was determined in the

4

T0

Bifurcated

Response Brief as Exhibit C.4 Based 0n the

Philip

Title

The contents 0f

7

[IDWR] issued his recommendations for the claims. He recommended the claims be decreed in
the name of Philip Cash as sole owner.” Cash at 2. “These water rights were previously decreed
in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”) to Respondent Philip Cash. Notwithstanding,
Judge Elgee subsequently quieted title in the rights to the Petitioner based on pre-decree
considerations. In doing so, Judge Elgee offended principles of res judicata by failing to place
appropriate weight on the SRBA proceeding and the water right decrees entered as a result of
that proceeding.” Cash at 2. Unlike the record in this case, Philip Cash owned the water rights
before, during, and after the SRBA. If the plain reading is correct, then the only outcome this
Court can follow is that the SRBA was the last word on ownership; meaning, South County
continues to own the entire 289/289th of the Water Rights. See Opening Br. at 36-37.
Belle Ranch attempts to distinguish the plain reading of Cash by directing the Court to
the “window of opportunity” that existed after the SRBA partial decrees were issued in the name
of South County and before entry of the Final Unified Decree. Resp. Br. at 15. As previously
addressed, the Final Unified Decree simply recognized the validity of IDWR administrative
actions that could affect the four elements of an SRBA partial decrees that were statutorily
capable of being altered by IDWR. Opening Br. at 32-36. As a creature of statute, IDWR had
no authority to determine, alter, or change ownership; therefore, no actions Belle Ranch took
with IDWR before entry of the Final Unified Decree could affect ownership. Had Belle Ranch
filed documents with the SRBA district court, which it did not, the outcome could be different.
According to Belle Ranch, I.C. § 42-1411(2) and I.C. § 42-1412(6) “unequivocally link[]
the claimant to ownership of the water right.” Resp. Br. at 24. While this may be true when
unity of title exists between land and water, it is equally true that when ownership of water has
been reserved from land as allowed for by law, Joyce Livestock, the presumption may not stand.
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Not referenced by Belle Ranch
case

— that

decree

in the absence

may not be
The Court

is

Judge Wildman’s observation — seemingly anticipating

of unity 0f title, the name and address element of an

this

SRBA partial

dispositive:

further notes that while the appurtenance 0f a water right t0 a particular

piece of land

may be relevant t0

circumstances,

it is

w

determining ownership of that water right in some

not in and of itself dispositive of the issue of ownership

owner 0f a piece of land is also the
owner of the water rights appurtenant t0 that land. However, it can be equally true
that the owner 0f a piece of land is not the owner of the water rights appurtenant t0
that land.
Indeed, is has long been held that “water may be appropriated for
beneﬁcial use 0n land not owned by the appropriator, and this water right becomes
the property of the appropriator.” First Security Bank 0f Blackfoot v. State, 49
Idaho 740, 291 P. 1064 (1930). Thus, Idaho law recognizes there maV be a
bifurcation between ownership of the land and of the water right used 0n the land.
circumstances.

Cash

at 8

It is

true that very often the

(emphasis added).

Here, Judge Wildman’s observation

is

directly applicable t0 the case at

hand and should

be recognized When, as here, ownership 0f the water has been “bifurcated” from land.
Consistent with the chain of events documented in Exhibit A t0 the Response Brief, and

March

1,

2010, the 15.3/289th was bifurcated, conveyed, and recorded in Blaine County.

June 17, 2010, the remaining 273.7/289th was conveyed from South County to

Deed

in

Lieu 0f Foreclosure

happened

m

Recommendation,
Thus, before the
decrees, South

.

.

.

.

.

.

2010

the July 9,

.

.

.

R. 657;5 Resp. Br. at

Special Master’s Report and

2010

.

.

.

Amended

[and the] August 31, 2010

.

.

.

7.

By

MWB through a
These events

Recommendation

for each

Special Master’s Report and

Order of Partial Decrees.” Resp. Br.

SRBA district court began issuing reports

at 13.

of the special master and partial

County owned no amount 0f the Water Rights. Without unity of title, the

rationale of Judge

By its

(“MWB Deed in Lieu”).

the “June 28,

of the Water Rights,

5

by

Wildman

express terms the

leads to reversing the district court, recognizing the deeds of record

MWB Deed in Lieu ofForeclosure was a “quitclaim” deed.
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R. 657.

in Blaine

County control FSC’s and Fosbury’s respective ownership of the 15.3/289th of the

Water Rights, and quieting

title

thereto.

FSC’s And Fosbury’s Claims Are Not Void Due T0 Mountain West Bank’s Second
And Third Mortgages

E.

Belle

Ranch argues any conveyances

mortgages were “void” pursuant to LC.

that

were recorded

after

§ 55-812. Resp. Br. at 34.

MWB’s

second and third

Idaho Code § 55-812

“Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not exceeding one

states:

(1) year is

void against any subsequent purchaser 0r mortgagee 0f the same property, 0r any part thereof, in

good

faith

8 12.

“A

and for valuable consideration, Whose conveyance

duly recorded interest

recorded interest

is

is

ﬁrst duly recorded.” I.C. § 55-

is

effective against prior unrecorded interests only

taken for a valuable consideration and in good

either actual or constructive, that the

unrecorded interests

exist.

3”

faith, i.e.,

Langroz'se

where the

‘Without knowledge,

Becker, 96 Idaho

v.

218, 220, 526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974).

First,

later

v.

a mortgage

is

an encumbrance 0n real property and does not operate t0 defeat a

conveyance of title. In Re: Rehearing

Girard, 57 Idaho 198, 217, 64 P.2d 254,

at

217, P. at

_

(1936).

;

John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. C0.

Even

if

MWB’s previously recorded

secured interests were not released, those secured interests do not defeat South County’s

conveyances 0f the 15.3/289th t0 FSC’S and Fosbury’s predecessors—in—interest.
Second, Belle Ranch’s argument does not apply because the record shows
actual

knowledge of the release 0f its security

interests in the entire 15.3/289th

due

MWB had
t0 the

MWB

Letter Agreement, R. 15 1 3, and the

MWB Partial Releases.6 A Deed in Lieu ofForeclosure

Agreement (“DIL Agreement”) was

also executed

6

The term

by

MWB.

between

MWB and South County, Charles

“MWB Partial Releases” refers t0 the seven Partial Release[s] ofLien that were executed and recorded
See Resp.

Br., Ex.

A

and Opening Br.
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Holt, and John Scherer. R. 1615.

included in the conveyance t0

The DIL Agreement

“clarif[ied] that the

water rights were not

MWB, MWB added an Addendum t0 the Deed in Lieu of

Foreclosure Agreement (‘Addendum’) Which expressly recognized the Partial Releases.” R.

(MWB Letter Agreement); R.

1596. See also R. 1513-14

Releases as “defects

.

.

.

affecting

Payment Of Water

F.

title

.

.

.

MWB Partial

1509 (recognizing the

.”).

District Assessments

And Use Of Water Is Not An Issue In

This

Proceeding
This

is

an action for quiet

title,

t0 quiet title t0 their ownership. Belle

the one “using the water

title

appeal

.”
.

.

.

with

all parties to

Ranch adds

Resp. Br. at 46.

the proceeding

moving

for this Court’s consideration that

The question

proceeding. See Sagewillow, Inc.

v.

it

has been

for the Court t0 decide in this quiet

ownership. Use, non-use, or defenses thereto of the Water Rights

is

the district court

is

a separate

Idaho Dept. 0f Water Res., 138 Idaho 83 1, 70 P.3d 669

(2003) (discussion of the laws 0f forfeiture and defenses thereto).

G.

Belle

Ranch Cannot Claim Adverse

Possession In

Water

District N0.

Referencing Water District No. 37 delivery records and citing
in Hillcrest Irr. Dist.

Ranch argues

it is

v.

Nampa & Meridian Irr.

Dist.,

this Court’s prior decision

57 Idaho 403, 66 P.2d 115 (1937), Belle

entitled to the 15.3/289th through a theory

0f adverse possession 0r

“This Court held that Hillcrest had used the water after the transfer and that

should be quieted in Hillcrest’s name.

Id. at

37

title

forfeiture.

to the

water

412. In Hillcrest the adverse use 0f the water

m

following the transfer was twenty years. Here the adverse use has been since the 2011 irrigation

season and then the 2012 transfer. Appellants do not explain

u_se

following a transfer Where they sat idly on their rights,

222(2)

(all rights

are lost or forfeited for

is

why ﬁve

irrigation seasons

not sufﬁcient.

ﬁve years of n0n-use).” Resp.

Compare LC.

§ 42-

Br. at 31 (emphasis

added).
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First, the

Water Rights

are located in a water district,

N0. 37. The law speciﬁcally forbids adverse possession
long as a duly elected watermaster

water

district,

which

in this case is

in a water district.

LC.

§

Water

District

42-607 (“So

charged With the administration of the waters Within a

is

n0 water user within such

district

can adversely possess the right of anV other

water user.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, Belle Ranch cannot claim ownership of the
15.3/289th through adverse possession.

Second, and as stated above,

this is

an action to quiet

not a legal proceeding t0

title,

determine use, non-use, 0r defenses against forfeiture. If there were a ﬁnding 0f forfeiture,

Which there cannot because the question was not before the
forfeiture could

be established, LC.

§

to apply the

any

and

42-223 (enumerating defenses against

“rights t0 such water shall revert t0 the state

chapter; except that

district court,

right t0 the use

and be again subj ect

of water

shall not

be

lost

if n0

defenses to

forfeiture),

to appropriation

then

under

this

through forfeiture by the failure

water t0 beneﬁcial use under certain circumstances as speciﬁed in section 42-223,

Idaho Code.”

I.C. §

42-222(2) (emphasis added). Reversion 0f rights to the State does not vest

ownership in Belle Ranch.

The Appeal

H.

Is

Not Barred By LC. § 5-224 And This Court’s Decision In Brown

v.

Greenheart
Belle

afﬁrmed due
its

Ranch

raises

an independent issue on appeal that the

to the expiration

of a four-year statute 0f limitation. Resp. Br.

argument, Belle Ranch cites I.C.

157 Idaho 156, 335 P.3d

1

district court

(2014).

§

5-224 and

N0

statute

this Court’s decision in

should be
In support of

at 36.

Brown

v.

Greenheart,

of limitations should apply to divest

FSC and

Fosbury of their respective ownership in the 15.3/289th of the Water Rights. Alternatively,
statute

of limitations were to apply,

an adverse claim was learned

REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL
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if a

cannot begin working against any party t0 this appeal until

0f.
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First,

title

no

statute

to the 15.3/289th t0

Deed

in Lieu,

the 15.3/289th,

there can be

of limitations applies against

convey

t0 Belle

FSC and Fosbury because MWB

Ranch, due t0 the

MWB Partial Releases, the MWB

and the Estoppel Certiﬁcate, R. 1049. Because

no

have conveyed

interest could

no application of I.C.

Second, the

district court

§

of laches and

GBCI

MWB never had

never

or on to Belle Ranch. Without

made

of this Court. R. 1820 (“Respondents raise

reach the alternate theories raised by Respondents.”) (emphasis added); R. 1932

.

.

.

title,

a decision as t0 passage 0f any statute 0f

of limitations in their Motion. [T]he Court

statute

the statute of limitations has run

any part 0f

t0

title

5-224 and, by extension, the Court’s decision in Brown.

limitations; therefore, the issue is not in front

alternate theories

to

never had

.

However,

this issue is n_ot

.

.

(“It

.

does not

gm

that

necessary t0 this decision”)

(emphasis added).
Third, even assuming for the sake of argument that a four-year statute of limitations does

apply,

it

did not begin t0 accrue until January 13, 2015 or thereafter. In Brown, a question raised

was When does a “cause of action
property ‘adverse

to’ another.”

for quiet title accrue

Brown

at 162,

335

P.

where another person claims an

3d

chain of events, determining accrual of the claim began
Greenheart’s action t0 change

On

at 8.

when

interest in

There, the Court looked at the

the

Browns “learned” 0f

IDWR’S water right records:

February 17, 2012, allegedly Without notice t0 the Browns, Greenheart ﬁled a
Water Resources

notice 0f change of ownership With the Idaho Department 0f

(“IDWR”).

On March

22, 2012, the

IDWR

revised

its

records to indicate that

Greenheart was the current owner 0f a portion 0f the water rights held by Browns
and reduced the quantity 0f rights held by the Browns.

It

was not

until the

in the deed,

and

Browns learned from an

oan after

attorney that there might be a mistake

Greenheart apparently perceived an opportunity to take

advantage 0f the Browns, that for the ﬁrst time Greenheart claimed an interest in
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Browns’ water rights by ﬁling a notice with the IDWR. At no time before 2012
was there any action bV Greenheart adverse t0 the Browns’ water rights.
the

160-162; 335 P.3d at 5-7 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

Id. at

Therefore, the test from

When

did anyone “learn[]”

Brown, and

§

by

like the

as to the accrual 0f the four-year statute 0f limitations is

Browns

as t0 Greenheart

— 0f an adverse

as to actions in front of IDWR, Greenheart’s adverse interest

actual notice

notice

—

Brown

was given

to the

interest? In

became known because

Browns by IDWR. R. 1587; R. 1534-35. The mailing of actual

IDWR to the Browns allowed IDWR t0 meet its mandatory notice requirement in LC.

42-248(3) (“The director of the department 0f water resources will be deemed t0 have provided

notice concerning any action

action

is

by the

director affecting a water right or claim if a notice of the

mailed t0 the address and owner of the water right shown in the records of the

department 0f water resources
started the clock running

Here, there

at the

on the

time of mailing the notice.”) (emphasis added). The notice

statute

of limitations.

was no compliance with

January 13, 2015, 0r thereafter.

the notice requirement in LC. § 42-248(3) until

When ownership was

0n or around September 30, 201 1, South County was
none. R. 679, 1597. Ownership was changed t0

owning nothing

at the

time as

it

“changed” from South County

entitled t0 notice

GBCI)

had deeded away

to Belle

from IDWR, yet received

its

ownership to

GBCI 0n June

again

Ranch, n0 notice was provided

While Belle Ranch claims

that the “transfer”

it

its

to its

t0 anyone. R. 692, R. 1597.7

IDWR,

R. 656,

IDWR constituted notice, Resp. Br. at 39, the transfer
IDWR to do, which was to simply alter the legal description

ﬁled With

could accomplish no more than what Belle Ranch asked
for

17, 2010.

owned nothing due

Despite Idaho Independent Bank’s (“11B”) notice of security interest 0n ﬁle with

7

MWB

MWB 0n or around that date despite MWB

When IDWR purportedly changed ownership from MWB (Who
prior conveyance t0

to

place of use. Opening Br. at 14. Moreover, as discussed in this reply, ownership cannot be changed
it lacks the statutory authority to d0 so. See also Opening Br. at 33-36.

by

IDWR because
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which

entitled

modify

it

to notice

“of

m

proposed or ﬁnal action to amend, transfer or otherwise

n0 notice was provided.

that water right,” I.C. § 42-248(6) (emphasis added),

t0 provide notice, this

meant the requirements of I.C.

§

By failing

42-248(3) were unfulﬁlled, making

it

impossible for anyone to learn of what actions were being taken.

0n January

In stark contrast,

13,

2015, and exactly as was done in Brown,

IDWR

provided actual notice t0 Belle Ranch, copied t0 Rabo, 0f its decision to change ownership in the
7.5/289th t0

challenged

FSC. R. 785. Fifteen months

IDWR’S

later,

on March 21, 2016, Belle Ranch eventually

decision as t0 FSC’s ownership. R. 786.8

IDWR later responded

have the legal authority to resolve the dispute, directing the parties
R. 37 and R. 837. Thereafter, 0n June 3, 2016,

ownership documents ﬁled With

December 2016, R.

14;

R3.

9,

title

title.

did not

R. 843; see also

IDWR informed Fosbury that his change of

IDWR could not be addressed.

advice of IDWR, complaints to quiet

to quiet

it

were ﬁled by the

R. 577. Following the legal

parties with the district court in

well within four years 0f learning of the adverse interest.

Consistent With Brown, the ﬁrst time the mandatory requirements of I.C. § 42-248(3) were met
as t0

FSC was

January 13, 2015.

Ranch’s adverse

interest,

As

t0 Fosbury, the earliest

through notiﬁcation by

he could have learned of Belle

IDWR, was

June

3,

2016, the date

IDWR

declined t0 process his change of ownership request. Under both dates, the four-year statute 0f
limitations has not expired.

8

Did Belle Ranch and Rabo

that the four-year statute

intentionally chose to

0f limitations had run?

sit

on

their position for 15

By waiting

15 months, Belle

months

in order to bolster their claim

Ranch now

creates an

argument

that

the four-year statute 0f limitations ran.
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FSC’s And Fosbury’s Ownership Of The 15.3/289‘“ Of The Water Rights Should
Not Be Denied Under Theories Of Equitable Estoppel, Quasi—Estoppel, And/Or
Waiver

I.

As independent

issue

on appeal, Belle Ranch argues the appeal should be denied based

0n the theories of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and/or waiver. The basis of the argument
the Estoppel Certiﬁcate, executed
.”

Resp. Br. at 41. Belle

i.

To
(1)

by “John

Ranch cannot

Scherer, the

managing member 0f South County

establish the elements to

.

.

is

.

meet these defenses.

Equitable Estoppel
prevail under the doctrine of equitable estoppel,

it

must be shown:

a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or

constructive

know

knowledge of the

truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did

0r could not discover the truth;

concealment was made With the intent that

(3)

the

that

not

representation or

false

be relied upon; and (4) that the person
to whom the representation was made, 0r from where the facts were concealed,
relied and acted upon the representation 0r concealment t0 his prejudice.
J.R. Simplot C0.

Belle

Belle

v.

Chemetics Intern, Ina, 126 Idaho 532, 534, 887 P.2d 1039, 1041 (1994).

Ranch cannot

prevail under this theory because

Ranch has not identiﬁed what alleged

constructive knowledge.” Throughout,
15.3/289th of the

Herrmann

v.

it

cannot satisfy the ﬁrst element.

“false representation”

FSC and Fosbury have

was made “With

maintained they

Water Rights and have never made any representation

Woodwell, 107 Idaho 916, 922, 693 P.2d 1118, 1124

equitable estoppel t0 apply, the

concealment of a material

ii.

it

fact

Herrmanns must have made a

(Ct.

actual 0r

own the

t0 the contrary.

App. 1985) (“For

false representation 0r

with actual 0r constructive knowledge 0f the truth”).

Ouasi-Estoppel

Turning to the theory of quasi-estoppel,

it

“prevents a party from successfully asserting a

position inconsistent with a previously-taken position, with

rights, t0 the detriment

0f the person seeking t0 invoke
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knowledge of the

facts

and of its

Birdwood Subdivision Homeowners’
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Assoc,

Inc.

v.

Bulotti C0nst., Ina, 145 Idaho 17, 22, 175 P.3d 179, 184 (2007). “Furthermore,

for quasi-estoppel t0 apply,

must be unconscionable

it

to allow the party t0

be estopped t0

maintain an inconsistent position.” Id. (emphasis added). “Quasi-estoppel
gasp theory under which a defendant

conduct

plaintiffs’

positions

Where

it

may still

who can point to n0

for

them

to

essentially a Iait-

speciﬁc detrimental reliance due to

assert that plaintiffs are estopped

would be unconscionable

is

d0

from asserting allegedly contrary

so.”

Schoonover

Bonner County,

v.

113 Idaho 916, 919, 750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988) (emphasis added).
First,

and as just

stated,

FSC and Fosbury have never changed positions

ownership of the 15.3/289th. Instead,
the

FSC and Fosbury have

maintained their interest stems from

MWB Partial Releases and subsequent deeds from South County.

0f Belle Ranch,
references the

this

ownership

is

regarding their

Contrary to the argument

supported by the Estoppel Certiﬁcate, which expressly

MWB Partial Releases and the Litigation Guarantee.

R. 1049. Belle Ranch’s

attempt to twist the language of the Estoppel Certiﬁcate to “include[]” instead of exclude the
15.3/289th

is

non-sensical. Resp. Br. at 42.

was not conveyed by South County t0
not included in the extensive

list

The Estoppel Certiﬁcate conﬁrms

that the 15.3/289th

MWB, due t0 the fact that the MWB Partial Releases were

0f conveyed items. R. 1050. Instead, they were simply

referenced in a separate sentence at the end of the paragraph. If FSC’s and Fosbury’s

predecessor had intended for the conveyance t0 include the 15.3/289th, then

executed quitclaim deeds conveying the interest t0

MWB.

However,

MWB Partial Releases were not included as a conveyance t0 MWB

it

is

.

.

.

encumbrances and claims” except those

did not.

The

fact that the

is

“free

and clear 0f all

in the “litigation guarantee.” R. 105 1.

plain language of the Litigation Guarantee speciﬁcally identiﬁed the
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ﬁthher evidenced by

paragraph 12 of the Estoppel Certiﬁcate, Which states that the property
liens

it

The

MWB Partial Releases as
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“defects, liens,

encumbrances or other matters affecting

the Partial Releases in the Estoppel Certiﬁcate

any

interest in those portions

title

.”
.

were included

.

.

R. 1509. “The reference to

t0 clarify that

of South County’s water rights.” R. 1596.

Second, there can be no ﬁnding of quasi-estoppel because there
result arising

from any purported change

interest in the 15.3/289th t0

Ranch has never been

convey

to

in position. This is because

Last, Belle

15.3/289th of the

no unconscionable

MWB never had any

GBCI and by extension to Belle Ranch.

entitled to the 15.3/289th

Ranch advances

Therefore, Belle

and cannot sustain an unconscionable

a theory of waiver t0 defeat

Water Rights. Waiver

right 0r advantage.” Frontier Fed. Sav.

And Loan Ass ’n.
It is

result.

595, 603 (201

1).

asserting waiver

Silence

is

Land

C0.

v.

v.

title

relinquishment of a

to the

known

Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 812, 853

a question of intent Which will not be

instead requires the party asserting waiver t0

manifesting an intent t0 waive.” Km’pe

FSC’s and Fosbury’s

“is a voluntary, intentional

P.2d 553, 557 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

by

is

Waiver

iii.

inferred

MWB n0 longer had

show “a

clear

and unequivocal act

Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 P.3d

not sufﬁcient t0 establish waiver. Id. Additionally, the party

must “show

that

he acted in reasonable reliance upon

[the waiver]

and

that

he

thereby has altered his position to his detriment.” Id.
Here,
15.3/289th.

FSC and Fosbury never intended to relinquish any portion

As

stated above, Belle

Ranch’s reliance on the reference

Releases in the Estoppel Certiﬁcate
the Estoppel Certiﬁcate

is

of their rights to the

to the

MWB Partial

simply an attempt to create confusion, falling short

When

and Litigation Guarantee are read as a Whole, particularly when

considering the facts and circumstances regarding execution 0f the Estoppel Certiﬁcate. R.
1596.

Even

if Belle

Ranch could somehow
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waiver,

would

it

still

not receive

title

to the 15.3/289th; instead, title to the

SRBA partial decrees.

remain with South County, pursuant to the plain language of the

The

J.

District Court’s

Water Rights would

Judgment Should Omit Reference To Secured

Interests

Of

Creditors

According
entirety

t0

RABO,

“[T]his Court should

of the Water Rights, but

RABO’S properly perfected
issue 0f secured interests

Opening Br.

RABO’S

at 39.

in their Joint

Second,

was not addressed by the

is

0r

is

not. Belle

Response

RABO is incorrect.

district court until

district court to a

Ranch and

its

citation to a

interest

0f MWB.

FSC

is

mortgage between

Keybank Nat’l Ass ’n

RABO and Belle Ranch).9
to

.

.

PAL I, LLC,

155

UCC Financing Statement

.”
.

v.

Resp. Br. at 43 (Without

Therefore, the previously recorded

Which FSC

is

a successor,

is

superior, U.S.

Bank

CitiMortgage, Ina, 157 Idaho 446, 452, 337 P.3d 605, 611 (2014) (“a mortgage recorded

Ranch acquired

the land and the 273.7/289th of the

When GBCI and MWB executed deeds conveying
does not

What

a successor t0 IIB. Additionally,

RABO “loaned money t0 Belle Ranch

Mortgage and UCC Financing Statement,

Belle

that supports

mortgage (“11B Mortgage”) on June 25, 2009, R. 638,

security interest in the collateral.

were ﬁled well before

9

Judgment.

RABO have similarly not identiﬁed a

Idaho 287, 290, 311 P.3d 299, 302 (2013). The IIB Mortgage and

v.

document

its

UCC Financing Statement With the Idaho Secretary 0f State 0n June 26, 2009, R.

1500, perfecting

N.A.

entered

Brief.

to record a

Which was superior to the secured

HB

it

First, the

RABO ignores that MWB afﬁrmatively released its secured interest in favor 0f

HB, R. 15 13, allowing IIB

IIB ﬁled a

0f the Water Rights are encumbered by

security interest.” Resp. Br. at 44.

There was n0 citation by the

secured interest

document

that the entirety

afﬁrm not only that Belle Ranch owns the

list

a

Water Rights 0n 0r around December 20, 201 1, the date

the property t0 Belle Ranch. See Ex.

A

t0 Resp. Br.

Exhibit

A

RABO mortgage 0r other security interest.
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first in time has priority against all other subsequent mortgages”), with no evidence in the record
showing the secured interest was released or foreclosed.
Third, whatever argument RABO is making appears as if it wants to stand in the shoes of
MWB, despite MWB disclaiming any interest in this appeal and filing no responsive briefing.
For these reasons, the district court’s Judgment should be corrected to omit reference to the
secured interests of any creditor.
IV.
BELLE RANCH SHOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS IN THIS CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION
Belle Ranch moves this Court for an award of costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to I.C. §
12-121, I.A.R. 35, 40, and 41. “The Court will award fees to a prevailing part under Idaho Code
section 12-121 when the Court believes that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Resp. Br. at 44 citing Thornton v. Pandrea,
161 Idaho 301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 875 (2016). “Appellants have done just that. Appellants
have pursued this lawsuit and appeal without a sound legal or factual theory in the face of
overwhelming legal precedent and clear statutory requirements.” Resp. Br. at 44.
This could not be further from the truth. This is a novel case of first impression that has
been fairly pursued by all parties. The Court has never been asked to address the interaction
between I.C. § 6-401, I.C. § 42-222, I.C. § 42-248, Idaho’s water adjudication statutes, Idaho’s
conveyance and recording statutes, and Paragraph 13(1) of the Final Unified Decree. Regardless
of how the Court rules, its decision will establish how owners of water rights and holders of
secured interests in river basins that have undergone, or will undergo, a general stream
adjudication must perfect their rights. This includes not only the entire Snake River Basin, but
also other areas of the State where general stream adjudications have been authorized. I.C. § 421406B (statutory authorization for the “Northern Idaho water rights adjudications” in the “Coeur
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d’Alene-Spokane river basin, the Palouse river basin, and the Clark-Fork Pend Oreille river
basins ”).

10

As

a case of ﬁrst impression With far-ranging implications,

award costs and fees pursuant

t0

LC.

§ 12-121.

Doe v. Doe,

inappropriate to

it is

160 Idaho 31

1,

317, 372 P.3d 366,

372 (2016) (“Because we have not previously addressed whether a court could appoint part-time
co-guardians,

Ada

we

will not

award attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121”); Hoagland v.

County, 154 Idaho 900, 916, 303 P.3d 587, 603 (2013) (“Attorneys fees are not warranted

where a novel

legal question is presented”); Trunnell

942 (2012) (“A party

is

v.

Fergel, 153 Idaho 68, 72, 278 P.3d 938,

not entitled t0 attorney’s fees if the issue

is

one 0f ﬁrst impression in

Idaho.”).

CONCLUSION

V.

Based 0n the foregoing,
7.5/289th of the

Water Rights

to

this

matter

be quieted t0

Rights to be quieted t0 Fosbury. The
Belle

Ranch

t0 allow administrative

Uniﬁed Decree

to alter the

IDWR, by its own

is

not barred by resjudicata, allowing ownership of

FSC and ownership

“window

in time” relied

documents ﬁled With

0f 7.8/289th of the Water

upon by the

district court

and

IDWR before entry of the Final

deeds 0f record in Blaine County

is

incorrect,

due

to the fact that

admission, has n0 statutory authority to alter ownership. If this action

barred by resjudicata, the only outcome

is

the

Water Rights

are

owned

County. Under any outcome, and With the issue not squarely before

Judgment should be corrected

to

it,

in their entirety

is

by South

the district court’s

omit any reference t0 the secured interests 0f creditors. Lastly,

1°

The Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication has been commenced With issues beginning to come to this
by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe). The Palouse River
Basin Adjudication was commenced 0n March 1, 2017, In Re: The General Adjudication ofRights t0 the Use 0f
Waterfrom the Palouse River Basin Water System, Case N0. 59576 (Twin Falls County), and is starting the process
Court. See Docket No. 45381-2017 (federal reserved claims ﬁled

0f accepting claims.
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as a case of ﬁrst impression, the Court should

deny Belle Ranch’s motion

for attorneys’ fees

and

costs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

25th

day of May, 2019.
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/S/ Chris

Chris
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M. Bromley

Attorneys for Appellant
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